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PRACTICE NOTE
REPRESENTING CHILDREN ON APPEAL:
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, CHANGED MINDS
Judith Waksberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an inherent tension between appellate practice and
the representation of children. An appeal is normally a review of
a record that is frozen at the time the record is made. The lives
of children, however, are not static and the circumstances and
conditions of their lives, and those of their families, are
constantly changing. Moreover, the changes that time has
wrought, including a change in the child's experience and
maturity, can also result in a change in the child's position in the
case. Thus, appellate attorneys representing children are not
infrequently confronted with situations in which circumstances
have changed significantly from the time of the order appealed
from or in which the child has changed his or her position.
* The author is the Director of the Appeals Unit of the Juvenile Rights Practice of The
Legal Aid Society of New York. The author wishes to thank Claire Merkine, Judith Stem,
and Gary Solomon for their inspired and constructive criticism and suggestions; Tamara
Steckler for her advice and encouragement; and most importantly, Philip Genty, as always,
my best editor.
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Rules and Standards for children's attorneys make clear
that attorneys for children must "zealously advocate the child's
position"' and "follow the child's direction throughout the
course of litigation."2 This is true even when the reasons for the
child's positions or desires may not be evident, or may perhaps
seem unwise, to his or her attorney. Although an attorney may
also be skeptical of the wisdom of an adult client's goals, when
children are the clients, the attorney's understandable impulse to
protect the child may make it difficult to respect the child's
choices and decisions. 3 However, only when the attorney is
guided by his or her client's desires and advocates zealously for
them will the child's perspective be presented to the court.
Although this mandate applies with equal force to appellate
attorneys, its application can be problematic. The appellate
process, by its nature, is a deliberative one. Its purpose is to
provide a review of the record and an impartial determination by
a panel of judges as to whether error occurred during the trial
and whether that error requires a reversal of the judgment at
trial. Appellate lawyers comb through the record and fashion
arguments for and against reversal. The appellate judges review
1. R.C.J.N.Y. § 7.2(d); see also New York State Bar Association Committee on
Children and the Law, Standards for Attorneys Representing Children in Custody,
Visitation and Guardianship Proceedings 2, http://www.nycourts.gov/ad3/0AC/2008
CustodyStandards.pdf (summarizing, in commentary to § A-1, the provisions of Rule 7.2,
which require, among other things that the "attorney for the child should be directed by the
wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child believes that what the child wants is
not in the child's best interests").
2. American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, pt. I, § B-4, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/child law/repstandwhole.authcheckdam.pdf (ABA 1996) (accessed
Feb. 23, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
3. For purposes of this article, I am assuming that the attorney has determined that the
child client has the capacity to comprehend the nature of the proceeding and the issues
raised, and to communicate a preference and comprehensible reasons for it; this may be at
age seven for most children and even younger for some. See e.g. Giving the Children a
Meaningful Voice: the Role of the Child's Lawyer in Child Protective, Permanency and
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings 3, http://www.legal-aid.org/media/6845 1/role/
%20ofY20jrp%201awyer%2010-08.pdf (Leg. Aid Socy. of N.Y. Aug. 2010) (noting that
"many children have this capacity by the age of seven, eight or nine"); Tamara Steckler &
Gary Solomon, Perspective: New Era in Representing Children, 240 N.Y. L.J. 2 (Oct. 22,
2008) (discussing the then-new Legal Aid Society policies).
4. See e.g. Matter of Mark T. v. Joyanna U., 64 A.D.3d 1092, 1093 (N.Y. App. Div.
3d Dept. 2009) (pointing out that "whether it be at the trial level or at the appellate level,"
the lawyer's responsibility to a child client "requires consulting with and counseling the
client").
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their briefs and the records, discuss the issues among
themselves, and then issue an opinion. Such a process is-and
should be-careful and thoughtful. As a result, the appellate
process is usually a relatively lengthy one. However, the length
of time involved in an appeal can create difficulties when the
lives of children are at stake. It is certainly not surprising that
changes can occur in a child's circumstances or that such
changes or a child's growing maturity will result in a change in
the child's position on appeal. Dealing with these changes in the
context of an appeal can pose some of the most thorny
challenges for an appellate attorney representing children.
To a certain extent, as will be discussed below, there are a
variety of options built into the structure of statutes and case law
to deal with a change in the child's circumstances. A change in
the child's position from the time of the Family Court order to
the time of the appeal can be somewhat trickier. An appellate
attorney will have to untangle the reasons and motivations
behind the child's change in position. The child's change in
position may very well be due to objective changes in the child's
circumstances. Or, the change could be due to the child's growth
and maturity in the intervening period which lead the child to
have a different conception and understanding of the
proceedings in which he or she is involved.
This article addresses the dilemmas raised for appellate
attorneys by changes in a child's circumstances or changes in a
child's position and discusses the ways in which appellate
attorneys can both ethically and zealously represent their child
clients in such situations. Section II addresses changes in
circumstances between the time of the Family Court proceedings
and the time the appeal is heard in the appellate court. Section
III deals with situations in which the position taken by the
attorney for the child has changed between the time of the
Family Court proceedings and the appeal. Section IV discusses
ways in which the attorney for the child can zealously represent
5. Although these issues are discussed here in the context of New York statutory and
case law, the same broad themes underlie the relevant law in most jurisdictions, so much of
the analysis used in this article should be applicable elsewhere as well. The reader
unfamiliar with New York practice should note that the Court of Appeals is New York's
highest court; its intermediate appellate courts are the Appellate Divisions of the New York
Supreme Court.
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the child on appeal as well as some other ethical considerations
relevant to these situations.
II. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of changed
circumstances directly in Matter of Michael B.,6 a case in which
the appellant was the child's biological father. Michael had been
voluntarily placed in foster care, but many years later, after a
finding that his father was fit, the Family Court ordered that
Michael be returned to his care. By that time, the father also had
in his care other children besides Michael. Michael, however,
had been in foster care since his birth and there was evidence
that he might suffer psychological trauma if removed from his
foster home. The Appellate Division found that Michael's
lengthy stay in foster care and his psychological bonding with
his foster family gave rise to extraordinary circumstances and
awarded custody to Michael's foster parents over his biological
father.7
The Court of Appeals ruled that when there is a fit parent,
the state cannot grant custody to a foster parent. The last two
paragraphs of the opinion, however, directly addressed the
problem of changed circumstances in these types of cases. The
opinion noted that the Court was informed that during the
pendency of the appeal, the appellant father was charged with,
and admitted to, neglect of the other children in his care.
Appellant argued that the Court could not take account of these
new developments because they were outside the record. The
Court's response was that to ignore these new developments
"would exalt the procedural rule-important though it is-to a
point of absurdity." 8 The Court went on to state that it
would therefore take notice of the new facts and allegations
to the extent they indicate that the record before us is no
longer sufficient for determining appellant's fitness and
6. 604 N.E.2d 122 (N.Y. 1992).
7. Id. at 126-27.
8. Id. at 133.
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right to custody of Michael, and remit the matter to Famil
Court for a new hearing and determination of those issues.
In the years since Michael B. was decided, the Appellate
Divisions in all four departments have remanded Family Court
cases on appeal when circumstances have so radically changed
that the record was no longer sufficient to determine the issue on
appeal. An analysis of the kinds of cases that are remitted and
the ways in which courts are willing to consider changed
circumstances on appeal provides some guidance in determining
how to proceed in these situations; these kinds of cases and the
various options available to appellate attorneys when
circumstances have changed are discussed below.
A. The Appropriate Forum for Changed Circumstances
Is Usually the Family Court.
First of all, it is important to note that an acknowledgement
of the changing nature of children's lives and its impact on court
cases is, for the most part, incorporated into the statutes and case
law dealing with these kinds of cases. Thus, for example, a
change in circumstances can give rise to a modification of
custody.' 0 In cases involving abuse or neglect, the Family Court
Act permits the Family Court to modify or vacate a prior order
"for good cause shown,"" and certainly, a change of
circumstances should constitute good cause.12 Moreover,
permanency hearings, which are held every six months while a
child remains in foster care, also provide a forum in which
changes in circumstances can result in a change in status of the
9. Id.
10. N.Y.F.C.A §§ 467, 652 (requiring a showing of changed circumstances). The
official text of the New York Family Court Act is available at http://public.leginfo
.state.ny.us. (Click on "Laws of New York," scroll down to "Court Acts," click on "FCT,"
click on the subdivision containing the desired provision.)
11. N.Y.F.C.A. § 1061.
12. Matter of Angelina AA, 322 A.D.2d 967, 968-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1995)
(noting that N.Y.F.C.A. § 1061 indicates that the court's power to modify an order for good
cause shown "expresses the strong Legislative policy in favor of continuing Family Court
jurisdiction over the child and family so that the court can do what is necessary in the
furtherance of the child's welfare"); see also Matter of Sarah S., 2005 WL 2254083 at 2
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. 2005) ("It seems clear that 'good cause shown' would mean a
'change of circumstances' to the Fourth Department").
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child, such as the child's return home or some other change in
placement.13
Therefore, when circumstances have changed significantly
enough from the time the order on appeal was rendered, and
there is a statutory means of re-opening the matter, the parties
should attempt to do so before the trial court. Whether the
changed circumstances are indeed significant and whether they
warrant a change of the original order are matters best decided
by the trial court. If a new order is issued, that generally will
moot out the appeal. If the trial court decides that the change of
circumstances does not warrant a change in its order, the movant
can usually appeal from that determination as well. By moving
to consolidate both appeals, the record reflecting the change in
circumstances will be brought to the appellate court's attention.
However, although Article Ten proceedings 4 involving
abuse and neglect provide statutory options in the Family Court
to revisit prior decisions, until recently, no such option existed in
cases involving termination of parental rights. 5 In these kinds of
cases, therefore, appellate courts have shown themselves to be
particularly hospitable to arguments that significant changes in
circumstances require remanding the case for a new hearing on
the best interests of the child. Before the passage of a law
permitting restoration of parental rights, there had been no clear
means of re-opening cases involving termination of parental
rights-even when circumstances had changed drastically.' 7
13. N.Y.F.C.A. § 1089 (a), (d).
14. "Article Ten proceedings" are those covered by article 10 of the N.Y.F.C.A., which
addresses child-protective proceedings involving abuse or neglect.
15. Upon a showing of good cause, a Family Court may "set aside, modify or vacate
any order issued in the course of a proceeding" under Article Ten. N.Y.F.C.A. § 1061. In
addition, the permanency hearings, which must be held every six months when a child is in
foster care, N.Y.F.C.A. § 1089(a), also allow a court to terminate the placement of the
child in foster care, return the child to the parent, place the child with a relative, or place
the child for adoption among a variety of permissible orders, N.Y.F.C.A. § 1089 (d). A
series of provisions that took effect in 2010 permit restoration of parental rights after their
termination, but only under very limited circumstances. See F.C.A §§ 635-637.
16. See e.g. nn. 24, 25 & 27, infra.
17. Prior to the enactment of statutory authority to restore parental rights, the ability of
a lower court to change the result of a termination-of-parental-rights case, even when the
circumstances cried out for it, was murky at best. See Theresa 0. v. Arthur P., 11 Misc. 3d
736 (Fam. Ct. Ulster Co. 2006) (allowing adoption petition by biological mother who had
voluntarily surrendered child after adoptive parents refused to allow child to return to their
home); Matter of Frederick S., 178 Misc. 2d 152 (Fam. Ct. Kings Co. 1998) (finding that
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Such radical events as the death of an adoptive parent, or the
refusal of a child over the age of fourteen to consent to the
adoption (which would make the child a legal orphan) could
only be taken into account on appeal.
Despite the enactment of a statutory procedure enabling the
restoration of parental rights for a very limited set of parents
whose rights had previously been terminated,' 8 the need for
flexible appellate review in these cases continues. The finality
entailed in termination of parental rights proceedings makes
them fundamentally different from neglect and abuse
proceedings. Even after a finding of neglect or abuse and
placement in foster care, children may still be returned
eventually to their parents.19 Terminating parental rights
completely cuts off the legal relationship between children and
their parents forever. Therefore, when events have changed from
the time that an order terminating parental rights was issued, and
those events affect the children's lives, the appellate court must
take those events into consideration in order to fulfill its parens
patriae duty to ensure that the best interests of the child are met.
Appropriately, therefore, appellate courts have generally taken
into consideration arguments that changed circumstances after
parental rights have been terminated require a remittal to the
Family Court for a new hearing on the best interests of the
child.
Family Court Act does not give court power to vacate a termination-of-parental-rights
order, but such order can be vacated under New York's Civil Procedure Law and Rules
because a child's decision to refuse to consent to adoption may be considered "newly
discovered evidence," yet nevertheless denying vacatur); Matter of Anthony S., 178 Misc.
2d 1 (Fam. Ct. Kings Co. 1998) (finding that law guardian (i.e., the lawyer representing the
child) has no standing to bring motion and further finding no statutory authority for court to
vacate order terminating parental rights); Matter of Tiffany A., 171 Misc. 2d 786 (Fam. Ct.
Kings Co. 1996) (dismissing petition for custody by biological mother whose rights were
terminated for lack of standing even though adoptive parent and child-care agency did not
oppose); Matter of Female S., Ill Misc. 2d 313 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1981) (finding that
Family Court has power to vacate prior termination of parental rights under its parens
patriae function); Matter ofRasheed A., 238 N.Y.L.J. 27 (Fam. Ct. Referee, King Co. Aug.
3, 2007).
18. N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 635-37.
19. N.Y.F.C.A § 1052(a); see also n. 15, supra.
20. See nn. 24, 25 & 27, infra.
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B. Alerting the Appellate Court to Changed Circumstances
Circumstances may change significantly from the time of
the order appealed from in any case involving children, not just
cases involving termination of parental rights. When
circumstances have changed significantly since the time the
original order was issued, an appellate attorney representing a
child is faced with the question of whether and how such
circumstances, which are not part of the record below, can be
made known to the appellate court. Although, as noted above,
most changes of circumstances are best handled by moving to
reopen in the lower court, there are situations where such a
motion may not be available or appropriate. In such cases,
attorneys sometimes have formally moved to enlarge the record
on appeal to include the new information. Such motions are
tricky, however. The information sought to be included must be
reliable, it must be relevant to the issue before the court, and it
must be clear why moving to enlarge the record, rather than
moving in Family Court, is the proper procedure.21
As a general rule, if the circumstances can be described as
controversial or contested, they should not be drawn to the
attention of the appellate court. For example, that a parent is not
''cooperating" or that the parent's relationship with the child has
"improved," are assertions that might very well be contested by
another party. In contrast, information of which the court can
take judicial notice, even if it is not part of the record below, is
acceptable. 22 Examples of such information would be the fact
that a parent has made a subsequent admission to neglect or has
subsequently been found to have committed neglect or abuse of
other children, or that the parent has made an admission in
21. Attorneys are often caught in a difficult position in these cases. It might be better in
some situations to move in Family Court for a re-evaluation of the case due to a change in
the child's circumstances. But some Family Court judges are disinclined to entertain such
motions when an appeal is pending, and will often tell the attorneys that they will not re-
evaluate the order until after the appeal is resolved. In such situations, an attorney may
have no option but to attempt to bring the new information before the appellate court.
22. See e.g. Matter of Chloe Q., 68 A.D.3d 1370 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2009)
(taking into consideration fact that subsequent to filing of appeal, appellant father
consented to an order granting custody of child to grandparents, thus rendering appeal
moot).
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criminal court to the abuse of a child.23 Appellate courts have
also accepted other kinds of information that are generally non-
controversial, such as the death of a foster parent24 or the fact
that there is no longer an adoptive resource available to the
child.25 Or, in the case of a child who is fourteen or near to
fourteen years old, appellate courts have accepted information
that the child will not consent to be adopted. The consent of a
child fourteen years or older must be sought for an adoption.26 If
the child will not consent, it is unlikely that an adoption will be
granted, and an affirmance of an order terminating parental
rights could result in the creation of a legal orphan. The
information that a child will not consent to an adoption, even if
that decision comes subsequent to the proceedings involving
termination of parental rights, is thus crucial information on an
appeal, and, as an officer of the court, the attorney for the child
may make such a representation to the appellate court on
appeal.27
The practice of appellate attorneys representing children at
The Legal Aid Society is to include an "update" section in the
brief after the statement of facts. This section is very short, and,
as described above, includes only non-controversial or non-
contested facts. If the child has decided that he or she will not
23. Michael B., 604 N.E.2d at 133 (taking notice of subsequent orders of neglect
involving other children based on father's admission to substance abuse, and remitting
matter to Family Court for a new hearing); see also Chow v. Holmes, 63 A.D.3d 925 (2d
Dept. 2009) (holding record no longer sufficient to determine child's best interests in light
of new facts indicating that father was awaiting sentencing for attempted assault, and
remitting matter to Family Court).
24. See e.g. Matter ofKayshawn E., 56 A.D.3d 471 (2d Dept. 2008) (considering new
facts, including that prospective adoptive mother has died and that children over fourteen
wish to be reunited with biological mother); Matter ofAntonette Alasha E., 8 A.D. 3d 375
(2d Dept. 2004) (holding that significant change in circumstances, including death of
proposed adoptive mother and biological mother's progress, warrant remitittur to Family
Court for new dispositional hearing).
25. Matter of Samuel Fabien G., 52 A.D.3d 713 (2d Dept. 2008); Matter ofEugene L.,
22 A.D.3d 348 (1st Dept. 2005); Matter of Christina Janian E., 260 A.D.2d 300 (1st Dept.
1999).
26. N.Y. Dom. Rel. L. § 111(a) (providing that "consent to adoption shall be required. .
[o]f the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or surrogate in his
discretion dispenses with such consent").
27. See e.g. Matter of Shad S., 67 A.D.3d 1359 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 2009);
Matter of Danielle Joy K., 60 A.D.3d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2009); Matter of
Londel Chavis C., 41 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dept. 2007); Matter of Marc David D., 20 A.D.3d
565 (2d Dept. 2005).
321
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
consent to adoption, this information will be provided to the
court. Including this updated information can also be important
even when the circumstances have not changed. Since, at the
time the appeal is considered, a year or more may have passed
from the issuance of the order being appealed, it is
understandable that the appellate court would want to be assured
that, for instance, the child is still being cared for in the same
foster home and that that foster parent intends to adopt the child.
Moreover, in cases where a child was removed from his or her
parent pending ongoing neglect or abuse proceedings and the
attorney for the child is advocating that the Family Court order
be reversed and the child be sent home, the reviewing appellate
court would want to know that there have been no significant
changes in circumstances since the Family Court's order so that,
if there is a reversal, the parent is capable of resuming care of
the child.
It is worth noting that an attorney is not obligated to report
changed circumstances to a court if the change in circumstances
is adverse to the client's position.28 However, if the attorney
appears at oral argument and is specifically questioned about
current circumstances, the attorney may not dissemble: New
York Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that an attorney
may not "make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal."29
III. CHANGED POSITION
Sometimes the difficulty in representing children on appeal
arises not from, or not only from, changed circumstances, but
also from the child's change in position. The passage of time,
28. There is no general affirmative duty to disclose adverse facts on appeal. N.Y. R.
Prof. Conduct 4.1 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a
client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts."); see also N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3 cmt. 14 (pointing out that
"[o]rdinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the
matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the opposing position is
expected to be presented by the adverse party" and also noting that a lawyer has a greater
duty in ex parte proceedings). However, the attorney must always and in every case
"disclose to the tribunal controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." N.Y. R. Prof.
Conduct 3.3(a)(2) (emphasis added).
29. N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1).
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maturity, or a new environment may mean that by the time an
appeal is perfected, the child's position is different from the one
the child's attorney advocated at the hearing below. Obviously,
if the child is the appellant but no longer disagrees with the
result below, the attorney may move to withdraw the appeal.
Representing the child client who is not the appellant, but who
has changed her or his position can be extremely challenging. If
neither the petitioner nor the respondent wishes to settle the
case, the child's ability to obtain or influence a settlement may
be minimal. In those situations, the appellate attorney for the
child may find herself in the awkward position of being forced
to advocate for a result different from the one that was
advocated below on the record. Changing position on appeal
raises a host of questions, not the least of which is the
application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Judicial estoppel is used to prevent a party who has
assumed a certain position in a legal proceeding from assuming
a contrary position in another proceeding 30 or to prevent "a party
from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then
relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another
phase."3 1 This doctrine "rests upon the principle that a litigant
'should not be permitted . . . to lead a court to find a fact one
way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the
same fact should be found otherwise."' However, as the
Supreme Court has noted, "this estoppel doctrine is equitable
and thus cannot be reduced to a precise formula or test."33 The
unusual position of a child in an appeal from Family Court
litigation means that this doctrine must be very carefully applied
in cases of this type and overly technical applications of the
doctrine have no place in an appeal in which a child has changed
position because of changed circumstances or his or her
evolving maturity.
For example, judicial estoppel seems completely
inappropriate when the change in the child's position is due to
30. N.H. v. Me., 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
31. Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227, n. 8 (2000).
32. Environmental Concern, Inc. v. Larchwood Constr. Corp., 101 A.D.2d 591, 593
(N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1984) (quoting Student Author, The Doctrine of Preclusion
against Inconsistent Positions in Judicial Proceedings, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1946)).
33. Zedner v. US., 547 U.S. 489, 504 (2006).
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the fact that the child has reached an age at which he or she can
express his or her wishes. There are cases in which the attorney
for the child at the Family Court proceedings had to formulate a
position because the child was too young to express his or her
wishes or was incapable of understanding the proceeding, but at
the time of the appeal, the child has matured enough to have the
capacity to make an informed decision about his or her position
in the litigation. At the time of the appeal then, the child's
position may differ from the one taken by his or her attorney at
the Family Court proceedings. Technically, the position of the
child has changed during the course of the litigation, yet one
cannot really say that the child himself or herself has changed
position. In these kinds of cases, it would not be fair to hold
those children to the original position advocated by their
attorney and judicial estoppel should not be used to prevent an
appellate attorney from representing the child's current position
on appeal.
Other considerations as well make the application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel inappropriate for children.34 Time
alone can have a significant impact on a child's position in a
case, as the child matures and becomes capable of a more
sophisticated understanding of acts and consequences. That a
growing maturity may change the child's position in a case
should not be surprising as it is part of what we all understand to
be the process of growing up. A child's changing of position in
the course of a Family Court proceeding will therefore likely
have nothing to do with attempting to "derive an unfair
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing
party"35  Rather, it is reflective of a greater maturity,
understanding, and ability of the child. The "general
consideration[s] of the orderly administration of justice and
regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings" that underlie the
doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions36 are not violated
34. Indeed, the author has been unable to find any cases in New York that specifically
apply this doctrine to a change of position by a child in a Family Court or custody
proceeding.
35. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 504 (quoting N.H. v. Me., 532 U.S at 751).
36. Environmental Concern, 101 A.D.2d at 593 (quoting Ariz. v. Shamrock Foods Co.,
29 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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when a child-due to greater maturity, or perhaps changes in his
or her circumstances-changes position on appeal.
Indeed, it is almost impossible to untangle the changes in
circumstances in a child's life from the changes in a child's
position. A child who may have originally supported a finding
and removal from the home, may, by the time the case is
appealed, be unhappy in foster care and very much want to
return home. In such a case, it is reasonable for that child's
attorney to argue that the best interests of the child no longer
require removal.
Moreover, a child may have many reasons for changing
position, including, as discussed above, a more mature attitude
about the events, or about the child's own circumstances. In any
event, assuming the child has been properly counseled, and there
is a reasonable basis for the child's change of position, there is
no reason that the attorney for the child should not be
representing that child's position on appeal. A court's
receptivity to such a change in position should therefore depend
on a number of factors. The reason for the child's change in
position, if it can be revealed, will be pertinent. If, on appeal, the
child is adopting an argument made by another party below,
then there is no strong reason to apply judicial estoppel on the
grounds that the child's argument would constitute a disregard
for the "orderly administration of justice" or "the dignity of
judicial proceedings," 37 for both sides of the case are already
being presented to the appellate court. Certainly in no case in
which the child's position has changed because the child's
attorney initially took a position on the child's behalf due to the
child's age, and the now-older child has taken a different
position, should judicial estoppel be applied. If a party raises the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, the court will have to determine
whether, in that particular case, its application would be
appropriate.
Because children's positions, and their circumstances, may
change during the time between the Family Court proceedings
and the appeal, and because the purpose of any Family Court
proceeding is the best interest of the child, it would seem the
better course for appellate courts to be as liberal as possible in
37. Id.
325
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
allowing the child to present his or her position on appeal. A
rigid approach can even result in the denial of appellate relief to
children. In Matter of Zanna E.," the court dismissed the appeal
of the respondent-father's stepdaughter, stating that because the
child had testified at the fact-finding hearing that she was
abused, she could not be "aggrieved" by the order determining
that the abuse had occurred and therefore could not urge reversal
on appeal.39 It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether
the child was supporting a finding below or even on whose
behalf she had testified below. If the child did not support a
finding, but testified because she was called as a witness, it
would be unfair to conclude that she could not be aggrieved by
the finding. Certainly a child could testify as to the existence of
certain facts and assert at the same time that those facts do not
legally constitute abuse or neglect.40
In sum, restricting the appellate attorney to the arguments
made in the trial court may very well mean that the interests and
wishes of the child will not be represented on appeal. The
expectation that a party maintain a consistent position during the
course of the litigation-an expectation that is inconsistent with
the reality of the representation of children-cannot be
reconciled with the zealous representation of a child at every
juncture of the litigation.
38. 77 A.D.3d 1364 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 2010).
39. Id. at 1364.
40. In Zanna E., the court also denied the father's biological daughter the opportunity
to appeal the finding of derivative neglect as to her, stating that this child could not "seek
affirmative relief' from the finding because she did not file a notice of appeal-this despite
the fact that the father himself was appealing the finding. See id. at 1364. Given that
circumstances may change, or the child's position may change, it seems too restrictive to
require the child to file a notice of appeal in order to participate in an appeal filed by
another party. Indeed, it appears that the Appellate Division's First and Second
Departments have never required that the child file a notice of appeal in order to take a
position urging reversal on appeal. This seems to be the better stance, as it provides
appropriate flexibility for the attorney to represent the child's position on appeal. However,
if the child does not file a notice of appeal and no other party appeals, then of course no
appeal can be perfected. If a child is aggrieved by an order of the Family Court, the only
way to ensure that the order is appealed is for the child's attorney to file a notice of appeal.
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IV. FINDING THE PATH TO ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION
ON APPEAL
Each individual case poses its unique challenges, and the
appellate attorney, in every case, must be working with the
client to determine the most efficient route to achieving the
client's goals in the litigation. For example, if there has been a
finding of abuse or neglect below resulting in the child's
placement in foster care and the child's objective at the time of
the appeal is to return home, the appellate attorney should
investigate whether this may be accomplished through avenues
other than obtaining a reversal on appeal, which is always a rare
event. If the parent has completed or is involved in services
addressing the original problem, it may be appropriate, and more
desirable, to move in the Family Court to advocate for the
child's return home.
Clearly, effective and sensitive counseling of the client is
just as important a component of representing a child on appeal
as it is in the Family Court. The appellate attorney has to explain
the ramifications of the appeal and review the possible options
available for the child. For example, the client might want the
attorney to advocate for the child's return home, yet also
understand that the existence of a finding of neglect means that
the child's parent has to comply with services and that there will
be oversight of the home-which might be to the child's
advantage. If so, on appeal, the attorney could be advocating
that the dispositional order placing the child in foster care was
not in the child's best interest and should be reversed or
remanded, but that the finding of neglect was proper and based
on a preponderance of the evidence.
Because the issue for the court in the dispositional phase of
the case is always the best interests of the child, it is not
logically inconsistent to argue on appeal that, given the time that
has passed since the entry of the original order, the best interests
of the child are no longer served by the dispositional order on
appeal. Although the passage of time alone will not usually be
sufficient to make such an argument, counsel may be able to rely
on evidence presented below that would support such a
conclusion, or there may be changed circumstances which
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indicate that the record below is no longer sufficient to
determine the issue on appeal.
Situations in which a child changes his or her position
between the trial and appeal may require serious counseling of
the client. Suppose, for example, that a twelve-year-old female
client made allegations of sexual abuse against her father. A
year later, at the time of the appeal, she tells her attorney that the
allegations were not true and that she wants her father to come
home. There may be many reasons for the child's recantation,
and these must be explored with the child before determining a
legal strategy.4' A lawyer may not knowingly use false
evidence, but the commentary to the applicable rule advises that
the prohibition applies "only if the lawyer knows that the
evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that the evidence
is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact."42 if
the client is insisting that the events upon which the finding
below is based are not true, and the attorney does not know that
the child's statements are false, then the attorney's duty to the
client is to advocate her position zealously to the court. Again,
because the recantation creates a change in circumstances, this
may be a situation where moving in Family Court to reopen the
hearing below should be contemplated.
Another important ethical consideration is that a client's
confidences or secrets may not be revealed unless the client has
consented to such disclosure.43 There are exceptions to this rule,
but its application can be particularly tricky with young clients.
For example, a fifteen-year-old female client may tell her
attorney that she prefers to remain in foster care and not return
to the care of her mother. However, the client does not want this
wish revealed; she still loves her mother and wants a continued
relationship with her, and does not want to hurt her mother's
feelings and further damage their already fragile relationship.
This client may direct her attorney not to file a brief on appeal:
To file a brief challenging the neglect finding and her placement
in foster care would not represent her position; on the other
41. The Juvenile Rights Practice is an interdisciplinary practice involving attorneys,
social workers, and paralegals. The advantages of working with social workers in
counseling clients on these very difficult issues cannot be overstated.
42. N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3 cmt. 8.
43. N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a)(1).
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hand, to file a brief supporting the finding and the placement in
foster care would be disclosing information she does not want
revealed. The appellate attorney must evaluate in each situation
how best to accomplish the goals of the child client.
V. CONCLUSION
Changed circumstances are almost always a legitimate
basis for seeking renewed review in the Family Court or arguing
on appeal that the matter should be remanded so that the Family
Court can take account of the new circumstances. A change in
the child's position, although it may be uncomfortable for the
appellate attorney, must also be analyzed carefully to determine
whether such a change is necessary in order to zealously
represent the child on appeal. In representing children, whose
lives-and whose minds-change more quickly than the legal
process can proceed, it is important that the child's attorney be
flexible in considering how to advocate for the client. Whether
to move in Family Court to reopen a case, to reveal the reason
for the change of position on appeal, or to argue that the
evidence is now insufficient to determine the child's best
interests are all strategic questions for the attorney in
determining how best to represent his or her client. The
important thing to keep in mind is not the attorney's discomfort
with the position, but how tactically to act in order to achieve
the client's goal. Appellate courts are well aware of the tension
between a traditional appellate review of a record on appeal and
the need for an order on appeal to reflect the current reality of
the lives of children involved in a particular case. In their
struggle to reconcile and balance these tensions, New York
courts and lawyers have cobbled together a practice that
attempts to respect the construct of appellate review and, at the
same time, to ensure that appellate review is meaningful to the
lives of the children it is meant to protect.
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